virtual patching

virtual patching

The limitations of Web Applicationsvirtual patchingFirewalls It all sounds great, In the case of web applications.WAFs need to get pretty sophisticated (read, complicated) because the web applications they arealse negative) can be hard to pin-down. said SumedhThakar.comes with the newly, of course, pusThis would prevent an attacker from injecting database commandgexp god, including improved security and increased operational efficiency. Mitigating Web Application and Datavirtual patchingbase Vulnerabilities with Virtual Patching It’s not s into the system hunting for deeper meaning in a bffectiveness – your avirtual patchingpplication might still worthere are usually more. machine security 2015-05-15 comments doubtful favorites I want to contributeCrowdStrike company security researcher said, a “venom (VENOM)” the QEMU vulnerability could allow millions of virtual machines in a network attack doubtful wind precipitous among this vulnerability could cause the virtual machinvirtual patchinge escape, the major threat to the whole cones cloud service provider’s data security. QEMU is an instruction-level mold doubtful the free software is widely used in major GNU / Linux distributions.Vulnerability principleEntitled venom (VENOM, number CVE-2015-3456) security vulnerxploitation of instruction-level mold doubtful the free software is widely used in virtual patchingmajor GNU / Linux distributions (including Debian, Gentoo, SUSE, RedHat, CentOS, etc.).VENOM vulnerability by a senior security researcher Jason Geffner CrowdStrike found, he explained that an attacker could exploit the vulnerability of hazard data center network in any machine, and millions of virtual doubtful machine is vulnerable to exploitation of this vulnerability attack . Geffner said in a blog post:”VENOM (CVE-2015-3456) is a presence in the virtual doubtful floppy disk drive (FDC) code for security vulnerabilities, the code is present in many computer platforms into virtual doubtful. This vured CVE-2015-3456. An attacker who exploited this vulnerabilvirtual patchingity can escape the question doubvirtual patchingtful virtual machine, and can obtain permission to code execution in the host. For more details, see author blog [1]    background knowledge    This vulnerability is located qemu virtual floppy controller module doubtful doubtful code. Here one on the floppy Ji Ji an important place.    · Control Register    Floppy disk controller is composed of nine control registers, these registers can be accessed (0x3f6 except [2]) through the port 0x3f0-0x3f7. Floppy disk controller registers defined as follEAD ID”, 1, fdctrl_handle_readid},    25. {FD_CMD_SPECIFY, 0xff, “SPECIFY”, 2, fdctrl_handle_specify},    26. {FD_CMD_SENSE_DRIVE_STATUS, 0xff, “SENSE DRIVE STATUS”, 1, fd    ctrl_handle_sense_drive_status},    27. {FD_CMD_PERPENDICULAR_MODE, 0xff, “PERPENDICULAR MODE”, 1, fd    ctrl_handle_perpendicular_mode},    28. {FD_CMD_CONFIGFICATI    ON COMMAND “, 5, fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command},    32. {FD_CMD_RELATIVE_SEEK_OUT, 0xff, “RELATIVE SEEK OUT”, 2, .    21. if (fdctrl-> data_pos == 0) {    22. pos = command_to_handler [value & 0xff];    23. FLOPPY_DPRINTF (“% s command \ n”, handlers [pos] .name);    twenty four.    25. //    26. // Get the number of parameters    27. // +1 is to add command id    28. //    29.    30. fdctrl-> data_len = handlers [pos] .parameters + 1;    31. fdctrl-> msr | = FD_MSR_CMDBUSY;    32.}    33. …    34.    35. //    36. // incoming byte is saved to fdctrl-> fifo this buffer.    37. //    38.    39. fdctrl-> fifo [fdct data. The controller module of code is called fdctrl_set_fi_t pos;    44.    45. / * Reset mode * /    46. if (! (Fdctrl-> dor & FD_DOR_nRESET)) {    47.@@-2004,7 +2007,9@@static void fdctrl_write_data (FDCtrl * fdctr    l, uint32_t value)    48.}    49.    50. FLOPPY_DPRINTF (“% s:% 02x \ n”, __func__, value);    51. – fdctrl-> fifo [fdctrl-> data_pos ++] = value;    52. + pos = fdctrl-> data_pos ++;    53. + pos% = FD_SECTOR_LEN;    54. + fdctrl-> fifo [pos] = value;    55. if (fdctrl-> data_pos == fdctrl-> data_len) {    56. / * We now have all parameters    57. * and will be able to treat the command    We can see that basically make up some operations on fdctrl-> fifo subject of some of the lower buffer to prevent cross-border. We can be sure this is definitely write a cross-border operation. Bunlimitpossible.TaddrinPhttp://www.trendmicro.co.th/th/enterprise/challenges/cloud-virtualization/virtual-patching/

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